Abstract. Numerical probabilities (associated with propositions) are eliminated in favor of qualitative notions, with an eye to isolating what it is about probabilities that is essential to judgments of acceptability. A basic choice point is whether the conjunction of two propositions, each (separately) acceptable, must be deemed acceptable. Concepts of acceptability closed under conjunction are analyzed within Keisler's weak logic for generalized quanti ers | or more speci cally, lter quanti ers. In a di erent direction, the notion of a lter is generalized so as to allow sets with probability non-in nitesimally below 1 to be acceptable.
' 2 A i fa 2 V : a j = 'g 2 H (1) for some family H Pow(V ) of \heavy" subsets of V . Clearly, the safest choice is to equate A with the j =-validities (i.e., the formulas ' such that for every a 2 V , a j = '), which is to say, to set H = fV g. But suppose we took a chance on some other choice of A (and H) where ' j ? means that for every a, if a j = ' then a j = . (Up) alone introduces no element of risk into A (or H) insofar as (Up) does not yield, from the assumption that V 2 H, any more elements of H. On the other hand, (Up) does suggest how to proceed | namely, by weakening j ? to some binary relation j on L or (turning to H) It is natural to expect that the intuitions that come to play in developing the rule (Up) j are syntactic (or proof-theoretic), whereas those for (Up) are semantic. An example where this distinction matters concerns the operation^of conjunction on L, for which it is understood that for every a 2 V , a j = '^ i a j = ' and a j = . It is largely on this simple example that the present paper turns.
Content of paper
There is a certain plausibility to asserting (And) if ' and are both acceptable, then '^ is acceptable if only because (i) it takes a bit of sophistication to even sense the di erence between \' and " and \'^ " and (ii) after such sophistication is acquired, we learn that the di erence does not (in a sense) matter, if acceptability is construed as validity (semantic or syntactic). (And) becomes problematic, however, as soon as we accept some exceptions. This is brought out most clearly perhaps by H. Kyburg's \lottery paradox": the proposition that one in say, a million tickets in a lottery will win is acceptable, as are each of a milion propositions asserting that a particular ticket will not win. The \paradox" vanishes after a moment's thought on the underlying semantics: were we to agree that A = f' 2 L : there is at most one a 2 V for which a 6 j = 'g ; we may run up against a pair ' and of formulas in A such that the one counter-example to ' is di erent from the one counter-example to , whence '^ 6 2 A.
But as long as we concentrate on the syntactic side A, choosing the semantics H to support the manipulations on A that we have decided to legitimize, there is hope for (And) . In this regard, it is worthwhile noting what Pearl 1994 calls a \long-standing tension between the logical and probabilistic approaches to dealing with such exceptions": whereas the former is \prescriptive" (insofar as logic is simply a record of \conversational conventions"), probabilities are \descriptive" (be they measures of objective frequencies or subjective beliefs). Now, the question is how could probabilities describe the logical rule (And)? A natural way to proceed is to accept precisely the formulas with probability greater than some xed threshold 2 0; 1] (say, .999), given a probability function pr from L to the unit interval 0; 1] A pr; = f' 2 L : pr(') > g : The hitch is that exceptions add up: from pr(') = 1 ? and pr( ) = 1 ? , one cannot, in general, do better than predict pr('^ ) 1 ? ( + ) . This suggests, assuming we stick with probability measures (rather than some alternative where, for example, conjunction is interpreted by the greatest lower bound operation in some lattice), that we (I) replace the condition that pr(') > by the requirement that 1 ? pr(') be in nitesimal, where in nitesimals are assumed to be closed under addition: if and are in nitesimals, then so is + . The notion of an in nitesimal here is exactly that introduced by A. Robinson in his non-standard reconstruction of calculus. Reversing chronological order, we could, as an alternative to (I), (II) explain away in nitesimals by -type limits ( a la Bolzano-Weierstrass). Pearl 1994 describes the work of Adams and Spohn in much this way, though without the emphasis on (And). I have decided here to focus on (And) because, together with (Up), it supports a very direct and general analysis of approaches (I) and (II), using no more structure than that implicated by line (1) above. This is made precise by Theorems 1 and 2 in xx2:1 and 2:2 respectively, where, in particular, no appeal is made to numbers, be they in the standard unit interval 0; 1], or some nonstandard copy thereof. This is not to say that the analysis given is incompatible with a numerical approach; only that it allows us to avoid all kinds of arithmetical complications | not to mention the somewhat embarrassing question: what probability function?
Without specifying a particular probability function, we return, in x3, to probabilities, bee ng up the rule (Up) to a rule (Up) , where means \at least as probable as." In this section, we refrain from making any commitment to the soundness or, for that matter, unsoundness of (And).
(Up) applies not only to models of (And), but also to A pr; = f' 2 L : pr(') > g, where pr is a probability function, and is some number in 0; 1]. (It is easy enough to introduce a rule restricting say, to be above 1 2 ). As weak as the rule (Up) might be, it nevertheless constitutes a step to understanding what is involved qualitatively in accepting formulas with probabilities that fall non-in nitesimally short of 1.
Related work
There is an evidently widespread belief that it is a non-trivial (if not hopeless) enterprise to reason qualitatively about formulas with probabilities greater than some xed threshold non-in nitesimally short of 1. Pearl 1988 puts the matter as follows Probabilities that are in nitesimally close to 0 and 1 are very rare in the real world. Most default rules used in ordinary discourse maintain a certain percentage of exceptions, simply because the number of objects in every meaningful class is nite. Thus, a natural question to ask is, why study the properties of a logic that applies only to extreme probabilities? Why not develop a logic that characterizes moderately high probabilities, say probabilities higher than 0.5 or 0.9 | or more ambitiously, higher than , where is a parameter chosen to t the domains of the predicates involved? The answer is that any such alternative logic would be extremely complicated and probably would need to invoke many axioms of arithmetic. pages 493, 494] A similar view can be found in Halpern and Rabin 1987, where Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 1990 , in which the rule (Up) j described above leads dangerously to monotonicity (p. 180). Instead, a weak system of cumulative reasoning is developed there, from which a j -form of (And) but not (Up) j can be derived. logical approach that departs minimally (if at all) from standard practice in classical mathematical logic. The one possible point of departure is the appeal to the weak logic of generalized quanti ers in Keisler 1970 (which arguably belongs to the mainstream of logic) for formalizing line (1) above, 2 and even then, the introduction of generalized quanti ers can be eliminated according to Theorems 1 and 2 below, resulting in ordinary predicate logic. Some specialists in the logic of generalized quanti ers seem to consider Theorem 1 part of the subject's folklore. It is implicit in van Lambalgen 1991, and appears in a disguised form as Theorem 5 of Alechina and van Lambalgen 1996, the inessential notational di erences being due to that work's somewhat novel syntax (involving modality) and semantics (motivated by proof theory).
A crucial syntactic point that ought to be stressed is the expulsion of numbers from formulas below | in contrast, that is, to the quantitative approaches in Keisler 1985 and Halpern 1990 , where numbers appear explicitly in formulas. The idea behind minimizing (explicit) reference to probabilities is to isolate what it is about probabilities that is essential to judgments of acceptability; but by opening the door to alternative non-probabilistic interpretations of formulas, the challenge then becomes showing that only the probabilistic semantics need matter. (More concretely, the problem in establishing completeness is how to de ne a probability measure from syntactic entities that do not mention numbers.)
2 Reasoning according to preference: lters A straightforward formalization of line (1) Pow(jM j) of subsets of the universe jMj of M, so that (relativizing (1) to (M; q)) (M; q) j = Qx' f] i fa 2 jMj : (M; q) j = ' f x a ]g 2 q for every function f mapping variables to objects in jMj (and where f x a is the function that maps x to a, but is otherwise identical to f). That is to say, (1) is analyzed by building an L-model M around the the set V of possibilities so that the acceptability of a formula ' can be evaluated by exposing (as it were) the \hidden variable" x, the instantiations of which are measured relative to q (= H M;q ) ' 2 A M;q i (M; q) j = Qx' : L(Q) o ers not only the expressive power of predicate logic (as well as the possibility of nested judgments of acceptability through iterations of Q), but also a natural model theory, relative to which a complete proof system can be obtained from a simple extension of one for rst-order logic by axiom schemes for -equivalence and extensionality (Keisler 1970 ).
2
A ne point about (1) and weak logic is that the extension of A to a binary predicate j on L can be treated by passing from unary to binary generalized quanti ers, at the cost only of notational clutter; see x2:3.
Filter quanti ers
Given a set V , a lter on V is a non-empty family H of subsets of V satisfying (Up) and closed under intersections | viz., V 2 H; whenever A 2 H and A B V , B 2 H; and for all A 2 H and B 2 H, A \ B 2 H (thereby supporting (And) 
holds for every L(Q)-formula ' with free variables x; y (where y is say, ordered according to some xed well-ordering of variables). (2) says that Q can be taken to be universal quanti cation 8
restricted to some set R of \generic" (or \normal") elements (modulo y). These generic elements are \transcendental" in y: assuming 8yQx(x 6 = y), they cannot be named by L-terms with free variables drawn from y. (Hence, the necessity of adding y to R.) Theorem 1. Proof. Fix an L(Q)-model (M; q) of F Q], and a nite set 0 of instances of (2). By the compactness theorem of weak logic (Keisler 1970) , it su ces to show how to expand (M; q) to a model of 0 . The idea is to interpret R as the set f(F (a); a) : is an L(Q)-formula; a 2 dom(F )g ;
for certain partial functions F (to be de ned presently) from the set of nite sequences of (the universe) jMj (of M) to jMj. Let n be the number of free variables in Qx . The domain of F consists exactly of the n-tuples a 2 jMj n such that ( ) (M; q) 6 j = Qx a] :
Given such a sequence a, let ' be the conjunction f' 0 : Qx' 0 has the same set of free variables as Qx ; (M; q) j = Qx' 0 a] and`Qx' 0 8x(R(x; y) ')' 2 0 g (appealing here to the niteness of 0 ). It is understood that an empty conjunction is some tautology. Using (Q3) in case the set is non-empty, it follows that (M; q) j = Qx' a] : Hence, by assumption ( ) and Qx'^:Qx 9x('^: ), to which (Q2) can, as pointed out to me by N. Alechina, be rewritten,
It remains to choose some such witness for the value of F (a). 2
Remark. The interpretation of R suggested in the proof of Theorem 1 can be described roughly as follows: for every L(Q)-formula such that (M; q) 6 j = Qx , throw in a witness to the set f: g f' 2 L(Q) : (M; q) j = Qx'g of formulas. What is \rough" about this description is that (a) we should be more careful to specify what variables and constants to allow in the formulas, and (b) the required witnesses may not exist in M. The rst point is a simple matter of bookkepping, while the second can be handled by appealing to the existence of elementary extensions that are !-saturated | suggesting a restatement of Theorem 1 as
In fact, Proposition 1 0 can be sharpened to so-called recursively saturated models (Barwise 1975) , as the sets of formulas that must be realized can be given e ectively as follows
, where L n is an expansion of the language L to n fresh constants (abusing notation in identifying L n (Q) with the set of L n (Q)-formulas with one free variable x). Note the similarity of (:Qx ) : to Henkin expansions that witness existential statements. The next section adapts notions from a celebrated method, the force of which is to omit rather than to realize types.
Graded normality
The proper extensions mentioned in Theorem 1 can be avoided, provided (2) is weakened to allow for varying grades (rather than an absolute, either/or, notion) of genericity: add an argument place to R, for a relation symbol < to be used with the intuition that u < v i u is \more generic" than v : More precisely, let L be a countable rst-order language, < be a fresh binary relation symbol (not in L), and let y v z abbreviate (y < z) _(y = z). Given Remarks.
1. (3) describes an -limit/asymptotic/co nal-type quanti cation, with (2) falling out as the special case given by u < v R(u) (i.e., the second argument v in < is vacuous). 2. The converse of Theorem 2 (the soundness of F Q] under (3)) is trivial: the schemes (Q1) and (Q2) follow from (3) alone, while (Q3) is a consequence of the transitivity of (as well as (3)). (I have not investigated what generality (3) buys beyond that of (2), in the absence of the assumption that < is transitive.) 3. The restriction to one free variable is inessential, and is made only to simplify notation, allowing us to suppress the subscripts y on < in (3).
4. An interpretation of < validating (3) in Theorem 2 is more complicated to describe than an interpretation of R supporting (2) in Theorem 1. In this connection, it is interesting to note the sentiment any fool can realize a type, but it takes a model-theorist to omit one expressed in Sacks 1972. The twist in Theorem 2 is that the \ontological promiscuity" in saturation arguments is avoided by a purely combinatorial argument (without resorting to any of the model-theorist's tools, such as completeness).
Proof of Theorem 2. Then set i+1 = i f(a; a 0 )g f(a; a)g w i+1 = w i f( ; a)g (recalling that a 0 was the element chosen at the outset satisfying :' 0 , and that a 6 2 I i , by (C5)). 
where y lists the free variables 6 = x in ' as well as . Line (4) supports a reading of the formula Qx('; ) as \for all relevant '-x's, ." Theorem 1 can be lifted to these binary forms, under the additional condition that R is \extensionalized" so that 8xy(' ' 0 ) 8xy(R ';x (x; y) R ' 0 ;x (x; y)) for all L(Q)-formulas ' and ' 0 with the same free variables x; y. Similar remarks apply to Theorem 2. (I.e., the relation symbol < must also be relativized to the antecedent ' and the quanti ed variable x, although its extension can be arranged to depend on ' only up to .)
3 Between preferences and probabilities: quasi-lters
Having upgraded a \normality" predicate R into a \preference" relation <, let us proceed further, into probability measures, concentrating on H (rather than on A). Fix a non-empty set V , and a eld F of subsets of V (containing V and closed under and ). Recall that a ( nitely additive) probability function on F is a function : F ! 0; 1] such that (V ) = 1, and for all A; B 2 F, 3.1 Weakening lters non-conservatively A family H F of sets in F is sizable if there is a probability function on F such that for every A 2 F, 3.2 A generalization of lters To avoid (Half) and (Cov n ), we quantify away as follows. Call H additive if it is -sizable for some . That is, H is additive i for some probability function : F ! 0; 1], and 2 0; 1], H = fA 2 F : (A) > g. Rewriting (Up) (from x1), with (A) (B) in place of A B, we
Note, however, that unless we know what is, we cannot assert (Up) . Could it be then that the best we could do to characterize additive families is to assert (Up)?
The following counter-example shows that there is more structure in additive families to account for.
(y) Let V f1; 2; 3; 4g and H = fA V : f1; 3g A or f2; 4g Ag. Although H veri es (Up), it is not additive: were it induced by , then as f1; 3g 2 H and f1; 2g 6 2 H, (f3g) > (f2g); but as f2; 4g 2 H and f3; 4g 6 2 H, (f2g) > (f3g).
To strengthen (Up), some notation is useful saying (roughly) that a sequence A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A n of sets in F is heavier than a sequence B 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B n (of equal length). With that in mind, let us write
to mean that for every a 2 V , The reals in (P) and (D) can be assumed to be rationals, and after clearing the denominators to make the y i 's in (D) positive integers, the negation of (D) can be expressed as ( 0 ) for all sequences A 1 ; : : : ; A n and B 1 ; : : : ; B n 2 F, (8i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng) A i < H B i implies not
(with y i the number of copies of the pairÂ i ;B i in the sequence A 1 ; B 1 ; : : : ; A n ; B n ). Now, ( 0 ) is just the contrapositive of ( ). 2 Remarks.
1. Theorem 4 is reminiscent of a theorem due to Kraft, Pratt and Seidenberg 1959, characterizing binary relations on nite Boolean algebras that can be read \at least as probable as." That characterization is established again in Scott 1964, employing methods similar to that used in the proof of Theorem 4 above, although I do not see how to reduce Theorem 4 to the Kraft, Pratt, Seidenberg/Scott result, as the notion of an additive family quanti es away even more information than the comparative relation \at least as probable as." (Of course, it is easy enough to express the unary predicate \probable" as \at least as probable as A", for some xed A; but our goal has been to isolate the bare minimum.) The \primal/dual" argument above appears to apply more generally than \the general method" (Theorem 1. , it su ces to add a rule of non-empty intersection (considerably weaker than (And)) (NEI) A 2 H B 2 H A \ B 6 = ; : For = m n , with m < n, add the rule that for any sequence A 1 ; : : : ; A n that partitions V , there is a subset I of f1; : : : ; ng with cardinality m such that i2I A i 2 H :
In yet another direction, the rule (Cov) n , from Proposition 3(ii), adds the restriction that < 1 ? 2 ?n . 4. To see that each case n ? 1 of ( ) is insu cient, let V = f1; 2; : : : ; n 2 g, and, recalling the de nition of < H in the proof above of Theorem 4, consider f1; 2; 3; : : : ; ng < H f1; n + 1; 2n + 1; : : : ; (n ? 1)n + 1g fn + 1; n + 2; n + 3; : : : ; n + ng < H f2; n + 2; 2n + 2; : : : ; (n ? 1)n + 2g f2n + 1; 2n + 2; 2n + 3 : : : ; 2n + ng < H f3; n + 3; 2n + 3; : : : ; (n ? 1)n + 3g . . . f(n ? 1)n + 1; (n ? 1)n + 2; : : : ; n 2 g < H fn; n + n; 2n + n; : : : ; n 2 g : (Note that if the left hand sides are packaged as an n n matrix A, then the right hand sides form the transpose A T of A.)
4 Conclusion: directions from and applications to natural language Although the approaches pursued in xx2 and 3 are compatible (insofar as (Up) and (And) imply ( )), the thrust of x2 | viz., extending (And) | runs opposite that of x3, the canonical models of which, A pr; , fail to verify (And). Were we to adopt (And), then x3 would become uninteresting; were we to reject it, then x2 would become pointless. My reason for keeping the two sections in one paper is that I see no compelling argument that can (once and for all) settle the matter for or against (And). Intuitions about acceptability simply di er | intuitions expressed in languages, begging to be investigated. Among these are natural languages such as English, the semantics of which might be explored in the hope, for example, of shedding light on the acceptability of (And). The skeptical reader is bound to protest at such naivet e: natural languages are not formal; surely! There is no denying that rst-order logic is formal in a way that English is not. Even so, there is a growing body of work inspired by R. Montague's slogan \English as a formal language" (1970/4), rephrased in more recent years as \Natural language as a programming language" (motivated by investigations into so-called \dynamic semantics," going back to, among other papers, Kamp 1981). More concretely, generic sentences admitting exceptions, such as \Birds y," provide a natural testing ground for questions about acceptability. And, in a slightly di erent direction, the very idea of formalizing, if not mechanizing, natural language leads to the problem of accepting exceptions. Brie y put, there is, I think, room for both xx2 and 3 in exploring the semantics of natural language.
Defeasibility in natural language interpretation
The transformation of \English as a formal language" into \natural language as a programming language" can be depicted by the equation Natural language interpretation = logic (e.g. model theory in Montague grammar) + control (e.g. choice of formula/disambiguation) ; the point being that some notion of \control" is required to formalize a natural language utterance before it can be subjected to a logical analysis. Moreover, that logical analysis may, in turn, feed back into how to formalize the natural language utterance (and so on). This suggests a broader construal of \logic" (as applied to natural language) than that traditionally associated with model theory. For instance, the resulting logic should, many argue, allow for defeasibility, a particular preferential approach to which is pursued in Asher 1993 and Lascarides and Asher 1993, that veri es (And) . Integrating this with statistical/probabilistic information is an obvious task crying out for attention. Stepping back a bit, basic logical issues raised by the problem of control are discussed in Fernando 1996 , where the challenge to compositionality posed by the context-dependence of disambiguation is taken up, and a logical approach based on generalized quanti ers is outlined.
4.2 A case study: back to many (naturally) Having derived much inspiration from Keisler 1970 , let us close by noting that a linguistically motivated analysis of many not only calls the lter properties (sound for the universal dual of there exist uncountably many) into question 4 but also introduces (at least) two other dimensions to the classical picture in Keisler 1970 (or, for that matter, in Westerst ahl 1989 : vagueness and intensionality. Passing from cardinalities to (vague subjective) probabilities over \possible worlds", Fernando and Kamp 1996 propose to de ne there to be many '-x's i the number of '-x's is more than what might be expected: for every natural number n 1, (9 n x)(') ((Many-x)(') Prob((9 <n x)(')))
where Prob is to be interpreted as an additive family H. The preceding formulas are to be understood in an intensionalized form of weak logic, within which the condition ( ) for additive families can be encoded in the manner of Segerberg 1971. (An extended account is in preparation with H. Kamp.)
